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divine? Chalcedon holds that the Son does not abandon or lose His divine 
nature when Incarnate.
These three examples are representative of the philosophical analysis 
as a whole. There are many useful ideas, interesting connections, and 
provocative arguments, but all are presented too quickly, debatable as-
sumptions are taken as settled, and alternative or opposing views are not 
given a careful hearing. The book is a good read as a step in the debate, 
but hardly—as Mullins’s tone throughout would suggest—the end of the 
debate. The timeless God is safe . . . at least for the present.
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The Hiddenness Argument: Philosophy’s New Challenge to Belief in God, by J. L. 
Schellenberg. Oxford University Press, 2015. Pp. x + 142. $35.00 (hardcover).
CHRIS TUCKER, College of William and Mary
John Schellenberg almost singlehandedly brought the problem of divine 
hiddenness, or the hiddenness argument, to the attention of academic phi-
losophers. But why stop with that stodgy lot? His latest book The Hidden-
ness Argument aims “to provide an accessible, brief, but vigorous statement 
of the hiddenness argument and an explanation of the associated issues 
designed for wide consumption” (ix). Freshman philosophy students 
could understand and benefit from this book. It is ideal for introductions 
to philosophy or undergraduate courses in the philosophy of religion. I 
myself enjoyed reading it and recommend it to academic philosophers as 
an introduction to the issues.
The book has eight chapters, as well as a short coda and a relatively 
comprehensive list of recent work on the hiddenness argument (making it 
all the more helpful for philosophy students). Chapter 1 lays out the basic 
critical thinking tools and vocabulary needed to appreciate the hidden-
ness argument. This material, while presented well, is unavoidably dry. 
This book would have engaged an even wider audience had this material 
been saved until later, say, just before discussion of the argument’s first 
premise. Chapter 2 identifies the sort of theism at issue, but it isn’t crucial 
to a basic understanding of the argument. Chapter 3 is my favorite. Its 
main goal is to explain why the hiddenness argument was only discov-
ered in the late twentieth century rather than centuries before. The most 
useful function of the chapter, however, is that it allows the reader to see, 
in engaging fashion, how Schellenberg’s argument is distinct from its pre-
decessors.
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Chapters 4–7 present and defend the argument (the full argument is 
given on 103). Chapters 4 and 5 concern the first two premises, respec-
tively:
1. If a perfectly loving God exists, then there exists a God who is always 
open to a personal relationship with any finite person.
2. If there exists a God who is always open to a personal relationship with 
any finite person, then no finite person is ever in a state of nonbelief in 
relation to the proposition that God exists.
From these two premises, it follows that:
3. If a perfectly loving God exists, then no finite person is ever in a state of 
nonbelief in relation to the proposition that God exists.
Chapter 6 defends the next premise:
4. Some finite persons are or have been nonresistantly in a state of nonbe-
lief in relation to the proposition that God exists.
The conjunction of 3 and 4 entail that:
5. A perfectly loving God does not exist.
In chapter 7, Schellenberg defends:
6. If no perfectly loving God exists, then God does not exist.
The conjunction of 5 and 6 entail the final conclusion of the argument, 
namely:
7. God does not exist.
Schellenberg addresses many challenges for the argument as he devel-
ops it. Chapter 8 reminds us of some of these points, while addressing 
some new challenges that one might have only after having the argument 
fully in view.
The rest of the review will focus on 1–3, especially Schellenberg’s dis-
cussion of the first premise. Schellenberg gives the impression that the 
relevant notion of openness in the argument is “thin or minimal” (40, 
emphasis original) and that one can see the truth of the first premise by 
considering only “simple arguments.” What I want to show is that, while 
Schellenberg articulates a genuinely thin conception of openness, he re-
lies on a far more demanding conception. If he wishes to avoid a familiar 
quagmire related to the intersection of ethics and action theory, he must 
jettison the minimal sense of openness from his argument. First, I explain 
how Schellenberg gets caught in the quagmire. Then I explain how he 
may be able to avoid it.
Schellenberg’s characterization of openness is contained in three suc-
cessive sentences. As you read, notice how minimal A is and how de-
manding C is:
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[A] Being open in the relevant sense at a certain time simply means not (then) 
being closed. [B] It means not through one’s own actions or omissions making it 
impossible for the other . . . to participate in personal relationship with one at 
that time should the other wish to do so. [C] Alternatively, and applying this 
now to God, it means that it will be possible for creatures who haven’t made 
it impossible themselves through their own God-obscuring resistance of the 
divine, to participate in a relationship with God; if they want to, they can do 
so simply by trying to do so (41, emphasis original).
In personal correspondence, Schellenberg tells me that A is supposed to 
be the minimal, intuitive idea of openness; B defines that intuitive idea; 
and C is the application of B to God. Schellenberg supposes that there is a 
single, minimal notion of openness at play in this passage. Not likely. I’ll 
show, first, that there is a big jump from A to C, and second, that there is 
no way for B to bridge the gap without incurring the need for substantial 
argumentation that Schellenberg hasn’t provided.
A-openness to X (i.e., openness to X according to A) just is not being 
closed to X. What is it to be closed to X? Here is an intuitive gloss. If I’m 
closed to X, then I’m inclined to take the necessary means of preventing X. 
If X is imminent, I will actively resist it. Suppose I’m closed to trying foie 
gras. Then I have some inclination to do whatever it takes to not try foie 
gras. I’m not going to order it. If someone puts it on my plate and asks me 
to have a taste, I’ll politely decline. If someone tries to feed me a bite, I will 
clamp my mouth shut like a stubborn child.
Suppose Fay is A-open, i.e., not closed, to trying foie gras. All that fol-
lows is that she’s not inclined to take the necessary means of not trying 
foie gras. She’s not going to actively resist it; however, it does not follow 
that she will actively pursue foie gras. If someone puts some on her plate 
and encourages her to try it, she will. Yet if there is any cost at all—if it 
would require something as trivial as getting up and putting it on her 
plate—Fay may never try foie gras. The key point is this: if all we know is 
that one is not closed to X, then there’s little to no presumption that X will 
obtain or that certain conditions necessary for X will obtain.
C-openness to X, in contrast, carries a guarantee that certain necessary 
conditions for X will obtain, at least when it is applied to God. God’s being 
open to personal relationship with person P guarantees that, if P wants 
to, P is able to have personal relationship with God just by trying. Now, 
why would God’s being open to personal relationship guarantee that this 
condition obtains? Presumably, it is not an accident or a complete stroke of 
luck that, if God exists, every finite person who wants can have a personal 
relationship with God just by trying. For C-openness to come with such a 
guarantee, presumably C-openness entails both that
(i.) God actively pursues the goal of ensuring that if a finite person 
wants to, she is always able to have personal relationship with God 
just by trying
and that
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(2) if God actively pursues that goal, then the goal is obtained.
Schellenberg confirms this reading during his defense of the second premise:
To put it in the terms we used in chapter 4 [i.e., the chapter defending prem-
ise 1], a loving God’s openness to meaningful, conscious relationship with 
us means that such a God will ensure that we always are in a position to 
participate in it—unless of course we’ve disqualified ourselves through self-
deceptive resistance toward God (60, emphasis is mine; cf. 45).
A God that is C-open to personal relationship doesn’t merely lack active 
resistance to personal relationship; such a God actively pursues it. Such 
a God ensures that a certain necessary condition for relationship always 
obtains.
There is, then, a significant shift from A-openness to C-openness. The 
former is minimal, the latter is demanding. A-openness to X requires only 
the absence of resistance (or the absence of an inclination to resist). There’s 
little to no presumption that (necessary conditions of) X obtain. C-open-
ness, when applied to God, requires that God actively pursue relation-
ship. It guarantees that certain necessary conditions of relationship obtain. 
Can B close the gap?
B-openness to X requires that, through one’s actions or omissions, one 
not make it impossible for X to obtain. B-openness appears to be more 
demanding than A insofar as B-openness requires that my omissions—my 
failures to act—not make it impossible for X to obtain. According to A, one 
can be open to X even if one doesn’t actively pursue it. So Fay can be open 
to trying foie gras right now even though she doesn’t right now go to the 
kitchen and put some on her plate. But her failure to act, her failure to get 
up and put it on her plate, is an omission that makes it impossible (given 
the circumstances) for her to try foie gras right now. So B is, at first glance, 
a more demanding conception of openness than A.
Yet B doesn’t take us anywhere close to C unless we make substantial 
assumptions concerning the metaphysics and ethics of omissions. Con-
sider a familiar example. Doctor is open to Patient not dying, but Patient 
declines life support. Thus, Doctor omits life support—Doctor fails to sup-
ply it—and so the patient dies. Did Doctor’s omission make it the case that 
the patient died? Did the doctor kill the patient or merely let him die? And 
should it matter to a perfectly loving Doctor whether the patient’s death 
involved killing the patient or merely letting him die? These questions 
raise difficult and controversial issues.
If Schellenberg is to argue that A-openness ultimately entails C-open-
ness, these difficult and controversial issues cannot be avoided. Consider 
this conjunction:
(a) there is a metaphysical difference between (i) God, through an omis-
sion, letting a nonresistant person fail to be able to have relationship 
with God simply by trying, and (ii) God, through an omission, making 
a nonresistant person unable to have relationship with God simply 
by trying; and
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(b) a perfectly loving God would have substantially less reason to avoid 
a(i) than to avoid a(ii).
If this conjunction obtains, then to bridge the gap between B- and C-open-
ness, we’d need further argumentation to show that God can’t merely let a 
person fail to have relationship with God simply by trying. If the conjunc-
tion doesn’t obtain, we need some argumentation to show that it does not. 
Either way, I predict that he will be forced to endorse some controversial 
theses concerning the metaphysics and/or ethics of doing versus letting. 
(As Schellenberg’s argument is actually formulated, I think he assumes 
that there is no difference between letting a nonresistant person non-be-
lieve and making a nonresistant person non-believe. See, for example, the 
discussion of Not Open on 57.)
Schellenberg’s argument, in its current form, leads to a familiar quag-
mire concerning the ethics and metaphysics of doing versus letting. It gets 
stuck in this quagmire insofar as Schellenberg uses the claim that God is 
A-open to relationship to establish that God is C-open to relationship. In clos-
ing, let me explain why he may be able to avoid the quagmire altogether 
by jettisoning A-openness from the argument.
Recall the first sub-conclusion of the hiddenness argument, which I’ve 
given an additional name:
Love Guarantees No Nonresistant Nonbelief [i.e., 3]: If a perfectly loving 
God exists, then no finite person is ever nonresistantly in a state of non-
belief in relation to the proposition that God exists.
Schellenberg reconstructs his argument for this sub-conclusion as relying 
on two premises, namely 1 and 2; however, his reconstruction obscures 
the role of C-openness in his argument. We can faithfully track Schellen-
berg’s reasoning while also illuminating the role that C-openness plays in 
the argument by providing an alternative reconstruction of Schellenberg’s 
argument for the sub-conclusion. This alternative uses three premises 
rather than two. The first premise of my reconstruction is the same as the 
first premise of Schellenberg’s reconstruction:
Love Guarantees Openness [i.e., 1]: If a perfectly loving God exists, then 
there exists a God who is always open to a personal relationship with any 
finite person. (44–45)
The second premise guarantees that God is C-open to relationship:
Openness Guarantees Ensuring: If there exists a perfectly loving God who 
is always open to a personal relationship with any finite person, then God 
ensures that, if a finite person wants to, she is always in position to have a 
personal relationship with God just by trying. (41; cf. 60)
Together these two premises establish that divine love guarantees that 
God is C-open, that God ensures that every nonresistant finite person is 
able to have personal relationship just by trying. By guaranteeing that God 
is C-open to relationship, Schellenberg makes it easy to take the final step 
to the desired sub-conclusion. Once Schellenberg points out that belief in 
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God now is required to now be able to have relationship with God just by 
trying (60), he secures:
Ensuring Guarantees No Nonresistant Nonbelief: If God ensures that, if a 
finite person wants to, she is always in position to have personal relation-
ship with God just by trying, then no finite person is ever nonresistantly in a 
state of nonbelief in relation to the proposition that God exists. (60)
These three premises (Love Guarantees Openness, Openness Guarantees 
Ensuring, and Ensuring Guarantees No Nonresistant Nonbelief) entail the 
desired sub-conclusion, namely Love Guarantees No Nonresistant Non-
belief.
I’ve claimed that what gets Schellenberg in the quagmire is his reason-
ing from A-openness to C-openness. This suggests at least two strategies 
for avoiding the quagmire: don’t rely on A-openness or don’t rely on C-
openness. The latter option doesn’t seem promising. If he refuses to rely 
on C-openness, he thereby refuses to rely on Openness Guarantees Ensur-
ing. The problem with this approach is that it becomes mysterious how 
Schellenberg can derive the guarantee that, if God exists, then there is no 
nonresistant belief. In other words, I don’t know how Schellenberg can get 
to 3 (i.e., Love Guarantees No Resistant Nonbelief) without asserting that 
God is always C-open to relationship.
Since C-openness seems essential to Schellenberg’s argument, the vul-
nerability to the quagmire is to be blamed on A-openness. The closer the 
notion of openness in 1 (i.e., Love Guarantees Openness) is to requiring 
mere absence of active prevention, the more minimal the notion of open-
ness and the easier it will be to establish Love Guarantees Openness; 
however, the more minimal the notion of openness, the bigger the gap 
between openness and active pursuit. Consequently, it will be harder to 
establish Love Guarantees Ensuring. Schellenberg will have to find some 
way of bridging the gap, for God, between mere absence of active preven-
tion and the presence of (successful) pursuit. This option will weaken his 
argument by making it depend on controversial assumptions concerning 
the putative distinction between doing versus letting.
Suppose Schellenberg jettisons A-openness from his argument and in-
sists that by “open” he always intends C-openness. This move would make 
Openness Guarantees Ensuring trivial and so very easy to defend. Would 
this move make it harder to establish that Love Guarantees Openness? 
Not sure, but I think the main disadvantages will be rhetorical. Schellen-
berg will no longer be able to claim that he’s working with a minimal no-
tion of openness. It also puts pressure on the aptness of the term “open,” 
as being “open to relationship” does not call to mind the sort of active 
pursuit involved in C-openness. Yet I don’t think this third option will 
introduce any new substantive problems into his hiddenness argument 
that aren’t already there. And, crucially, this option gets Schellenberg out 
of the quagmire. For he would no longer be trying to use the claim that 
God is not actively avoiding relationship to establish that God is actively (and 
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successfully) pursuing relationship. Hence, I suggest that Schellenberg drop 
the misleading claim that his argument relies on a minimal or thin notion 
of openness to relationship.
Whether the above criticism is apt or not, Schellenberg’s The Hiddenness 
Argument achieves its primary goal: it makes an important version of the 
hiddenness argument accessible to a wide audience.
